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Economic literature: papers , articles , software , chapters , books. FRED data. Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers. Becker George J.
Registered: Gary S. Gary S. Stigler, More about this item Statistics Access and download statistics. Corrections All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. Louis Fed. Help us Corrections Found an error or omission? RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.
Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of Enforcers
Skip to search form Skip to main content You are currently offline. Some features of the site may not work correctly. DOI: THE new economic approach to political behavior seeks to develop a positive theory of legislation, in contrast to the normative approach of welfare economics. The new approach asks why certain industries and not others become regulated or have tariffs imposed on imports or why income transfers take the form and direction they do, in contrast to asking which industries should be regulated or have tariffs imposed, or what transfers should be made.
Gary S. Becker 74 Estimated H-index: Estimated H-index: Find in Lib. Add to Collection. THE new economic approach to political behavior seeks to develop a positive theory of legislation, in contrast to the normative approach of welfare economics.